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Executive Summary
Best practice suggests that a modular enterprise architecture, where interfaces between 
and among business processes and services are standardized, is a key IT capability 
for firms to achieve profitable growth. But few firms have successfully designed, 
implemented, and maintained such an architecture. This article presents findings on the 
drivers, constraints, and actions taken by two companies that transitioned to a modular 
enterprise architecture in response to competitive pressures from their business partners 
or customers. One company implemented an industry standard and the other developed 
custom partner interface processes (PIPs) to achieve business modularity. The lessons 
from these two case studies show how companies can smoothly transition to a modular 
enterprise architecture.
THE INCREASING NEED FOR A MODULAR 
ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
At most companies, IT support for business processes has been cobbled together in 
a series of unrelated IT projects. Some projects build application silos; others link 
them together. The result is a highly inflexible IT architecture. Most IT and business 
executives agree that a more modular architecture—where IT-enabled business 
processes are plug-and-play components that can be used to meet changing business 
demands—provides far more capability for companies to grow rapidly and profitably. 
But inflexible legacy systems and processes are impeding progress in building 
modular IT and business capabilities. Firms wanting to move toward a modular 
enterprise architecture face a multi-year evolutionary process.2 Building modular 
capabilities is a gradual process and is often slowed down by the tendency to invest 
in immediate business needs rather than long-term capabilities. As a consequence, few 
companies have achieved a modular IT and business environment. 
In the meantime, the need for modular capabilities has been increasing. While many 
architecture efforts focused initially on leveraging a firm’s internal resources, many 
companies today are focusing on expanding their vertical and horizontal partnerships 
and extending operations globally. Thus it is important to understand how a modular 
enterprise architecture can enable firms to leverage resources across supply chains and 
distribution channels. 
Two major technological innovations are helping firms to interface flexibly with 
partners: 
1 Jeanne Ross is the accepting Senior Editor for this article.
2 See Ross, J. W., Weill, P., and Robertson, D. C. Enterprise Architecture as Strategy: Creating a Foundation 
for Business Execution, Harvard Business School Press, 2006, for a description of the stages that most companies 
go through as they work toward more modular architectures.
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1. Process standards in vertical industries 
2. Service-oriented architecture (SOA) 
technologies, which have created the tools for 
building modularity. In an SOA, functionality 
is encapsulated,3 and standardized interfaces 
and service levels are exposed.4 
This article describes the experiences of two 
companies as they transitioned to a modular 
enterprise architecture (Appendix A describes our 
research methodology). We have been studying these 
companies for several years, and we describe their 
major drivers for a modular architecture, the key 
constraints faced, and the actions taken to overcome 
the constraints. 
The first company, which we call Delivery Corp., 
provides supply chain services and is a large 
subsidiary of one of the global leaders in logistics 
and transportation. Its revenues in 2006 were about 
$10 billion. The markets for its diversified offerings 
are turbulent, and it faces significant and growing 
competition. As well as establishing a platform of 
standardized technology and optimized business 
processes, Delivery Corp. has been developing 
proprietary standards to integrate services across 
business units and with the business processes 
of customers. Delivery Corp. intends to establish 
standardized interfaces across complementary services 
so as to achieve profitable growth. 
The second company, which we call Electronics 
Corp., is a small-to-medium enterprise, with 
low product diversification. It has transitioned 
to a modular enterprise architecture by adopting 
RosettaNet’s industry standards for electronic 
business-to-business integration. This enterprise 
3 Encapsulation is a principle of information systems development 
that allows developers to hide the actual implementation (and 
associated design decisions) of procedural logic behind a standardized 
interface. This interface is made available to clients (e.g., other systems 
or interfaces) that need to access and use the procedural logic to 
perform a function.
4 See Hirschheim, R., Welke, R., and Schwarz, A. “Service-Oriented 
Architecture: Myths, Realities, and a Maturity Model,” MIS Quarterly 
Executive (9:1), 2010, pp. 37-48.
architecture enables loose coupling with suppliers and 
customers, and balances efficiency and flexibility in 
extended enterprise processes. 
These and other contextual differences between 
the two firms provide rich contrasts for identifying 
practical guidelines for transitioning to a modular 
enterprise architecture (see Figure 1). Delivery Corp. 
is standardizing interfaces among its complementary 
services, while Electronics Corp. is using industry-
established interfaces to coordinate with its suppliers 
and customers. In the next sections, we present the 
cases of these two companies, discuss their journey 
toward business modularity, the constraints they 
encountered in this journey, and actions they took 
to address these constraints. We conclude with a 
discussion of lessons learned from the two cases.
CASE 1: DELIVERY CORP.
Delivery Corp. was established in the early 1990s as 
a subsidiary of a global logistics and transportation 
leader in response to rapidly growing demand 
for supply chain solutions. Its parent company is 
positioned in a mature market for transportation 
solutions and has a strong culture rooted in six-
sigma capabilities for continuous improvement. In 
contrast, Delivery Corp. is positioned to operate in an 
innovative market for supply chain solutions, where 
assumptions of homogeneous customer requirements 
are invalid. 
In addition to core offerings, such as freight-
forwarding and customs brokerage, Delivery Corp. 
has pursued a differentiation strategy by developing 
a wide variety of specialty services, such as service 
parts logistics, technical repair and configuration, and 
supply chain design and planning. 
Delivery Corp. has grown rapidly in the past 15 years 
by following a strategy of aggressively acquiring 
specialized logistics firms. Although adding to the 
overall portfolio of offerings, the early acquisitions 
resulted in disparate business units that deployed 
Figure 1: Two Companies Moving to a Modular Enterprise Architecture
Delivery Corp. Electronics Corp.
Industry Positioning Integrated logistics solution provider Electronics component manufacturer
Company Size Large Medium
Process Standards Negotiated and proprietary Public 
Key Challenge Loose coupling among services offered to 
customers 
Loose coupling with suppliers and 
customers
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IT for local improvements and did not coordinate IT 
investments. Moreover, in the formative acquisition 
years, there were no IT standards to integrate 
technology “islands.” 
In the 1990s, Delivery Corp. attempted to alleviate 
the high costs and risks of its technology islands 
with initiatives that defined shared data, platforms 
and resources, and integrated applications through 
protocol interfaces. These initiatives helped the 
firm improve its cost structures by enabling the 
integration of applications and processes. As Delivery 
Corp.’s CIO explained, “We built standards; we built 
enterprise hardware standards, software standards, 
architecture standards, security standards, and 
implementation standards.” IT management also 
established significant discipline to measure costs for 
IT projects to assess return on investment.
In 2002–2003, Delivery Corp. moved to optimize 
its core business processes. Around this time, in an 
effort to streamline processes across business units, 
the firm established an enterprise view of data and 
applications. This view was a consequence of a 
major shift in IT strategy, away from improving local 
applications continuously to developing a shared 
infrastructure. 
One example of a shared capability was the creation 
of an enterprise data warehouse that extracted data 
from previously disparate transaction systems used by 
the business units. By aggregating data from different 
business units into a central repository, managers were 
able to obtain a comprehensive view of the entire 
breadth of services Delivery Corp. was providing to 
its customers. The shared capabilities helped the firm 
show “one face” to its customers. They also allowed 
sales managers to delve into a particular customer 
account to see how revenues related to service 
offerings, geographic territories, sales personnel, and 
other previously segregated entities. 
During this time, integrated processes for customer 
relationships, sales management, and IT management 
were also established.
Drivers of a Modular Enterprise 
Architecture
Although data standardization and application 
rationalization improved operational efficiencies, 
Delivery Corp. continued to evaluate an alternate 
operating model that would allow it to meet 
differentiated customer needs more profitably. As 
the COO of Delivery Corp. explained, “Our goal 
is to combine standardized services efficiently for 
customers so that they perceive the solution as 
customized.” 
To pursue growth in the competitive supply chain 
outsourcing industry, Delivery Corp. had to service 
customers that required a complex portfolio of 
differentiated solutions. These customers were 
not profitable for Delivery Corp. as meeting their 
requirements required significant IT customization. 
The process of integrating services across business 
units to meet customer requirements too often resulted 
in one-off initiatives with long lead times and high 
costs. It was taking between 8 and 12 months to 
integrate the processes required to deliver customized 
solutions, which harmed customer satisfaction, 
pushed up costs, and constrained growth. To address 
these performance issues, Delivery Corp. decided to 
standardize interfaces and develop “plug-and-play” 
capabilities for services offered to customers.
Developing a modular enterprise architecture 
became especially important for three reasons. 
First, standardized interfaces would help Delivery 
Corp. leverage its heterogeneous IT environment 
that comprised many interrelated applications for 
services—such as brokerage, freight-forwarding, 
and warehousing—that together support an end-
to-end supply chain solution. These applications 
were patched together with application program 
interfaces (APIs) that enabled data to flow between 
them. Second, the standardized interfaces and plug-
and-play capabilities would help Delivery Corp. 
develop efficient collaborative relationships with 
customers because it would not have to customize the 
integration of processes to meet their requirements. 
Finally, a modular enterprise architecture would help 
Delivery Corp. thrive in a highly competitive business 
environment where low-cost competitors pose 
significant challenges.
Constraints Encountered
We identified four key challenges faced by Delivery 
Corp. in transitioning to a modular enterprise 
architecture: non-modular business services, 
incompatible process interfaces, limited executive 
knowledge, and short-term decision criteria for IT 
investment. 
1. Non-Modular Business Services. Delivery 
Corp.’s portfolio of capabilities has evolved through 
organic growth and external acquisitions, which 
made the development of a robust and agile enterprise 
architecture especially challenging. The firm faced 
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significant challenges as each acquired company, 
and in many cases individual functional units within 
that company, had legacy systems, including ERP 
systems. Because Delivery Corp. grew so rapidly and 
had disparate IT systems that lacked standardized 
interfaces, developing enterprise solutions that pooled 
services across business units proved particularly 
challenging. 
2. Incompatible Process Interfaces. In an effort 
to be responsive to customers in the early years of 
its evolution, Delivery Corp. spent large amounts 
of money integrating customer processes with its 
core operations. As interfaces for services were ill-
defined, customers asked for unique APIs to integrate 
processes and exchange data. For example, they 
requested customized interfaces for advanced shipping 
notification or tracking the movement of goods across 
the supply chain. This IT customization pushed up 
costs and hampered the economies of scale needed for 
profitability. 
3. Limited Executive Knowledge of Enterprise 
Architecture. Some of Delivery Corp.’s senior 
executives had previously spent several years at 
the parent company, which operates in a different 
environment than Delivery Corp. As a consequence, 
these executives have a limited understanding of the 
role of enterprise architecture and do not appreciate 
its potential to standardize interfaces and dynamically 
integrate processes. 
4. Short-Term Decision Criteria for IT Investment. 
Net Present Value (NPV) techniques were used to 
evaluate IT investment proposals and to prioritize 
projects. Given this short-term focus, projects that 
contribute to and enhance long-term architecture 
capabilities received short shrift. For example, initial 
proposals to invest in encapsulating business services 
and standardizing their interfaces were not given 
the go-ahead, because they could not be justified in 
terms of generating revenue from meeting a current 
customer’s solution needs.
Actions Taken to Overcome the 
Constraints
Delivery Corp. undertook six major initiatives to 
overcome the constraints and transition to a modular 
enterprise architecture. 
1. Developing a Standardized Operating Model. 
Delivery Corp. is transitioning from a multidivisional 
model, where there was no coordination among 
services, to a standardized operating model, where 
the portfolio of services is being centrally defined 
and interfaces standardized. In the process, the firm’s 
managers are developing a shared understanding about 
complementarities of services and why the lack of 
standardized interfaces is inhibiting profitable growth. 
2. Developing Partner Interface Processes. Delivery 
Corp. is promoting the development of partner 
interface processes (PIPs) for high-volume services 
(see Figure 2). PIPs are self-contained process 
specifications that offer a loosely coupled architecture 
with standardized interfaces while enabling local 
differences. In fact, PIPs are designed to make 
business units agile by standardizing interfaces that 
encapsulate trading partners’ core data and business 
processes.
 
 
 
 
 
Delivery Corp. is taking steps to accelerate the 
adoption of PIPs by key stakeholders, including 
customers. The high-volume services targeted include 
advanced shipping notification, in-transit visibility, 
customs clearance, and warehouse activities. To 
learn about best practices and influence the industry-
wide development of PIPs, Delivery Corp. is 
participating in standard-setting boards for logistics 
and transportation and for vertical industries, such 
as the RosettaNet consortium,5 which develops 
industry-wide, open business process standards for 
supply chain collaboration in the high-tech industry. 
By investing in and influencing the development 
of PIPs, Delivery Corp. is standardizing interfaces 
and reducing complexity not only among its internal 
routine processes, but those of its customers too. 
3. Encapsulating Business Services. Delivery 
Corp. has been encapsulating services from legacy 
applications by reengineering those applications using 
the principles of component-based architectures. 
According to the firm’s CIO, “We’re getting to 
components. We have a subsystem that handles 
brokerage, we have a subsystem that handles 
forwarding, and we have a subsystem that handles 
5 For more information about RosettaNet, see www.rosettanet.org.
Figure 2: Partner Interface Processes
• Create a loosely coupled architecture that 
enhances the interoperability of services and 
business.
• Specify activities, decisions, and roles for each 
partner in a B2B activity.
•  Standardize interfaces and encapsulate data and 
processes.
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warehousing. … What we’re now doing is taking 
those core applications and putting APIs or other 
data flows out of them so you can actually build a 
workflow around those components.” These interfaces 
are being standardized, making it easier to maintain 
loose coupling among services so that they can be 
combined efficiently. Such a plug-and-play capability 
helps Delivery Corp. combine service offerings and be 
versatile in service delivery. 
4. Deploying Cross-Functional Teams. Delivery 
Corp. is using cross-functional teams to improve 
coordination between marketing and sales, and IT. In 
the past, marketing and sales personnel sold a suite 
of supply chain services (e.g., shipping, brokerage, 
freight-forwarding, customs) without adequately 
factoring in the IT investments that would be required 
for their integration. This led to slow responsiveness 
and increased costs in the delivery of solutions. 
Moreover, by bringing IT personnel into the RFQ/
solutions process at the front end of a customer 
engagement, the sales process is becoming more 
effective at promoting the proprietary standards that 
are supported by Delivery Corp. for its services. 
In addition, the IT personnel who interface with 
marketing and sales regularly provide IT architects 
with customer feedback on the standardized interfaces 
for services. 
These initiatives are improving the standards and 
gradually reducing the specialized learning and costs 
required to interface with a customer’s proprietary 
systems. According to Delivery Corp.’s CIO, “We’re 
working with marketing to put some real tight 
definition around our service portfolio so that our 
standard offerings can encompass 85% of what we can 
do.” 
5. Modifying Decision Criteria for IT Investments. 
Delivery Corp. is modifying the decision criteria for 
IT investments projects to include how standardized 
interfaces, if developed, can reduce costs and improve 
the time needed to respond to customer needs in the 
future. Using the modified criteria, a project that does 
not appear profitable based on NPV analysis may 
still be authorized if it enhances the standardization 
of interfaces and creates significant options for future 
growth. In addition, the decision criteria would now 
recognize that a short cut with a good NPV, but which 
hinders the move to a modular architecture, may 
actually restrict future growth options. 
6. Exploiting Best Practice Knowledge. Delivery 
Corp. participates in standard-setting organizations, 
such as RosettaNet and HL7 for healthcare,6 not only 
to influence the evolution of public domain PIPs, but 
also to be informed about best practice. In addition, 
ongoing interactions with customers are a rich source 
of information on best practice. This learning informs 
Delivery Corp. on how to design proprietary PIPs and 
leverage them for business value. 
Figure 3 summarizes the constraints encountered at 
Delivery Corp. in transitioning to a modular enterprise 
architecture and the actions taken to address them.
CASE 2: ELECTRONICS CORP.
Like Delivery Corp., Electronics Corp. operates 
in an innovative and highly competitive market. 
Electronics Corp. is a U.S.-based company that 
manufactures electronic components for computers 
and other electronic devices. Success in this dynamic 
environment depends on quick responses to customer 
demands and the ability to innovate. At the time of 
our initial contact with Electronics Corp., it had about 
1,000 employees, and its annual sales revenue was 
under $1 billion. It had a fairly flat organizational 
structure with a majority of employees being 
engineers and designers. 
Operating in the high-tech industry, Electronics 
Corp. has always been keen to deploy state-of-
the-art IT solutions. In the late 1990s, the firm’s 
executives adopted ERP systems and business process 
reengineering as these systems and techniques gained 
prominence. Electronics Corp.’s IT department, with 
the help of a major consulting firm, implemented an 
ERP system to support internal business functions, 
such as finance, marketing and sales, and human 
resources. 
During the ERP implementation, the firm underwent 
a substantial process change initiative that helped 
it streamline several major business processes. 
The firm’s executives referred to this process as 
“optimization” or “standardization” of internal 
processes. Senior executives who were responsible 
for product design and development processes took 
initiatives to standardize new product development 
and manufacturing processes. The ERP system also 
forced Electronics Corp. to standardize its data 
architecture. 
Standardization of IT platforms and business 
processes helped Electronics Corp. improve 
operational efficiency and achieve the economies 
6 For more information on the HL7 standards, see www.h17.org.
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of scale that were essential to survive in a highly 
competitive industry.7 These efforts prepared the firm 
for implementing modular systems and processes.
Drivers of a Modular Enterprise 
Architecture 
While standardizing internal IT capabilities and 
business processes helped improve operational 
efficiency, top management realized that the current 
IT platform and business processes were not 
delivering much customer value. Firms in the highly 
competitive electronics component industry need to 
respond constantly to changes in the market. Further, 
interorganizational relationships are very important 
as businesses like Electronics Corp. depend on 
other firms (i.e., trading partners) for the design and 
development of key components. There are several 
dominant firms in this industry that compete intensely 
with each other. Non-dominant firms also face 
tremendous competition in developing relationships 
with dominant firms to gain market share. 
Electronics Corp.’s senior executives realized that, 
while internal processes had peaked in efficiency, 
7 Ross and Beath note that to prepare for a modular architecture, 
companies adopt disciplined business processes, often implementing 
enterprise systems, such as ERP. See Ross, J. W. and Beath, C. M. 
“Sustainable IT Outsourcing Success: Let Enterprise Architecture be 
Your Guide,” MIS Quarterly Executive (5:4), 2006, pp. 181-192.
strategic external processes, such as those for order 
and supply chain management, were inefficient. To 
their surprise, senior executives found that the firm 
received customer orders via various communication 
modes—website, fax, e-mail, telephone, and a 
proprietary electronic data interchange (EDI) system. 
Moreover, the transactions were handled through 
an EDI system that was not fully integrated with the 
ERP system. Data received from customers were not 
compatible with the standardized data architecture that 
Electronics Corp. had created. As a result, employees 
had to manually enter the data into the ERP system. 
Electronics Corp. executives realized that manual data 
entry introduced errors in order management and other 
customer-focused processes, thus increasing response 
and cycle times. 
Further, Electronics Corp. had to hold high inventory 
levels to ensure orders were filled. Several mid-level 
managers, who had more experience with trading 
partners’ internal IT platforms and business processes, 
noted that the firm’s IT platform and processes were 
not compatible with many of its partners’ IT platforms 
and business processes. 
The inefficiency of interorganizational processes and 
lack of responsiveness of the IT department to meet 
customer demands forced top management to seek 
solutions. During their quest, top management became 
aware of RosettaNet. An initial assessment report by 
Figure 3: Summary of Constraints and Actions to Overcome Them at Delivery Corp.
Constraints Actions
Non-modular Business Services • Developing a standardized operating model to centrally define the 
portfolio of business services across business units.
Incompatible Process Interfaces • Encapsulating business services by reengineering legacy applications 
using the principles of component-based architectures.
• Developing proprietary PIPs to improve integration among services 
and across firm boundaries.
• Deploying cross-functional teams to improve coordination between 
marketing and sales, and IT, especially with respect to promoting 
standardized interfaces. 
Limited Executive Knowledge of 
Enterprise Architecture
• Generating shared understanding of the economic implications of PIPs 
in the process of developing the standardized operating model.
• Deploying cross-functional teams to increase knowledge about 
relative costs of developing customized interfaces and deploying 
standards.
• Exploiting best practices learned from process standards consortia and 
business partners. 
Modified Decision Criteria for IT 
Investments
• Modifying IT investment decision criteria to consider future benefits 
from developing proprietary standards.
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a senior executive suggested that implementation of 
RosettaNet’s standardized business processes—i.e., 
partner interface processes (PIPs)—could solve many 
of the problems facing the firm. Top management 
decided to implement RosettaNet PIPs and integrate 
them with the ERP system and internal business 
processes to develop seamless interorganizational 
business processes (see Appendix B for an overview 
of RosettaNet PIPs8). 
The vision of Electronics Corp.’s top management 
when it decided to implement RosettaNet PIPs was to 
be more responsive to customer and/or market needs 
and to become agile. While standardizing internal 
processes had optimized back-office processes, 
RosettaNet PIPs offered a unique opportunity to create 
a modular enterprise architecture. 
RosettaNet PIPs provide a plug-and-play capability 
and/or interface that enable a firm to reuse processes 
across interorganizational relationships.9 Electronics 
Corp. management decided initially to implement 
two PIPs related to order management processes 
(see Figure 4). Their implementation required 
substantial changes to Electronics Corp.’s overall 
order management process. Management was hoping 
that these two PIPs would help the firm eliminate 
redundant steps and inefficiencies from supply chain 
management processes. 
After the successful deployment of these two 
PIPs, Electronics Corp. management decided that 
four additional RosettaNet PIPs10 related to order 
management processes would be deployed. Together, 
these six PIPs would help the firm automate a 
substantial portion of its order management value 
chain. They would enable reusable process modules 
8 More details on RosettaNet PIPs can be found at www.rosettanet.
org.
9 See Gosain, S., Malhotra, A., El Sawy, O. A., and Chehade, F. 
“Towards Frictionless E-Business: The Impact of Common Electronic 
Business Interfaces,” Communications of the ACM (46:12), 2003, pp. 
186-195.
10 The four additional PIPs were PIP 3A6 (Distribute Order Status), 
PIP 3A7 (Notify Purchase Order Update), PIP 3A8 (Request Purchase 
Order Change), and PIP 3C3 (Notification of Invoice).
for Electronics Corp. that would provide capabilities 
for dynamic integration with trading partners.
Constraints Encountered
Electronics Corp. faced several constraints during and 
after the implementation of the first two PIPs. 
1. Deficient PIP Specification. Although RosettaNet 
PIPs specify how organizations should exchange 
business documents (that contain data) and 
choreograph activities, they do not provide detailed 
guidance on how to integrate these process standards 
with internal IT platform and processes. Electronics 
Corp.’s IT department struggled to integrate the 
XML-based data formats generated by the PIPs with 
the internal data architecture. Consequently, it was 
difficult to process this data using the ERP system 
that the firm used for much of its internal processes. 
Moreover, Electronics Corp. was not able to find 
any reliable middleware solutions to resolve the 
integration problem. 
2. Incompatible Process Interfaces. As noted earlier, 
Electronics Corp. optimized and standardized its 
internal business processes during the implementation 
of ERP. When implementing RosettaNet PIPs, the 
IT project team found that the process specifications 
suggested in the PIPs were, in many cases, not 
compatible with the firm’s internal processes. This 
was a major setback, as the internal processes were 
configured to fit with the ERP system and to provide 
operational efficiency. Reconfiguring these processes 
to align with RosettaNet PIPs required substantial 
changes to the internal processes and ERP system. 
3. Lack of IT and Business Process Expertise. 
Implementing RosettaNet PIPs is complex and 
resource intensive, requiring not only competent IT 
specialists, but also cross-functional business process 
experts. Furthermore, given that PIPs are standards 
for interorganizational processes, the implementation 
team needs members who have experience with 
and knowledge of trading partners’ internal IT 
platforms and processes. While Electronics Corp.’s 
Figure 4: The Two RosettaNet PIPs Initially Implemented by Electronics Corp.
PIP Description
PIP 3A4: Request 
Purchase Order 
Enables a buyer to issue a purchase order and obtain an immediate response from the 
supplier that acknowledges the status of the order (e.g., which purchase order product 
line items are accepted, rejected, or pending). 
PIP 3B2: Notifying 
Advance Shipment 
Allows a shipper to notify a receiver that a shipment has been assigned. This 
notification contains detailed product level information about a shipment (e.g., when a 
shipment is expected to arrive). 
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IT department was highly competent, implementing 
RosettaNet PIPs was a challenge due to the rigid PIP 
specifications and the need to come to grips with new 
standards. 
4. Declining Performance. Following the 
implementation of the PIPs, Electronics Corp. 
management was very surprised to find that 
operational efficiency decreased and cycle time 
increased for transactions with the three trading 
partners that used the new PIPs for placing orders. 
This was a major disappointment for those who 
had championed the RosettaNet project. The 
implementation team blamed the lack of integration 
and compatibility as the major reasons for the 
performance degradation.
Actions Taken to Overcome the 
Constraints
Despite the constraints, top management at 
Electronics Corp. pressed forward with several 
remedial actions and continued using RosettaNet 
PIPs in business transactions with trading partners. To 
ensure success, the implementation team took steps 
to address the constraints they encountered while 
implementing the initial two PIPs. 
1. Formation of Cross-Functional Teams. A team 
was formed with members from different business 
units to support transactions that used RosettaNet 
PIPs. The team ensured that customers who used 
the PIPs were able to interact with the standardized 
interfaces regardless of Electronics Corp.’s internal 
integration and compatibility issues. The members 
of the team had extensive training on RosettaNet 
vocabulary and business process orchestration. If 
necessary, the members manually entered the data 
received from RosettaNet PIPs to the ERP system 
to ensure high responsiveness and agility. A second 
team was formed to identify sources of process 
incompatibility and to develop long-term solutions to 
address them. This team examined and documented 
workflows, information flows, and data and document 
requirements for each internal process to be integrated 
with RosettaNet PIPs. Top management believed that 
this process understanding would help Electronics 
Corp. modularize more of its interorganizational 
processes using standardized interfaces, which would 
improve its responsiveness and agility. 
2. Fault-Tolerant Assimilation. The implementation 
team maintained the old processes in parallel with 
RosettaNet PIPs to ensure that customer orders were 
processed without delay or mistakes. This approach 
ensured the success of the modular approach 
because it allowed for local differences. In effect, 
employees were allowed to use traditional processes 
or RosettaNet PIPs depending on the importance of an 
order and a customer, which ensured loose-coupling 
of standard processes. The implementation team then 
decided to develop middleware that gradually took on 
the role of the cross-functional RosettaNet team. The 
middleware was designed to translate PIP data into a 
compatible format supported by Electronics Corp.’s 
standardized data architecture. Further, it developed 
workflows and transported these workflows to the 
ERP system so that employees responsible for an 
order performed the necessary actions. 
3. Exploiting Best Practices. Electronics Corp. 
decided to seek implementation help from its major 
trading partners that had already implemented 
RosettaNet PIPs. Senior IT executives and several 
managers from related business units visited 
trading partners that had successfully implemented 
RosettaNet PIPs. The firm also sought help from 
the RosettaNet consortium for internal integration 
activities. Several middle-level IT executives attended 
RosettaNet training and educational workshops. The 
knowledge gained by the members who visited trading 
partners and attended training programs was later 
documented and shared with other team members. 
Exploiting this knowledge helped Electronics Corp. 
develop necessary modules and associated interfaces 
for back-end integration so that it did not have to 
go through extensive reconfiguration of internal 
processes and the ERP system. 
Figure 5 summarizes the constraints encountered 
by Electronics Corp. as it used RosettaNet PIPs to 
transition to a modular enterprise architecture and the 
actions that were taken to address them.
LESSONS LEARNED ON 
TRANSITIONING TO A MODULAR 
ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
Both Delivery Corp. and Electronics Corp. initially 
developed their respective enterprise architecture 
capabilities to optimize processes and streamline 
data exchange. For both firms, this level of capability 
enhanced alignment between IT and the business 
within and across processes, and accelerated their 
responsiveness to shifts in markets. However, 
Electronics Corp. was confronted with inefficient 
coordination with suppliers, while Delivery Corp. 
was challenged to configure solutions efficiently for 
customers from its portfolio of business services. 
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Accordingly, each firm pursued initiatives to move 
toward a modular enterprise architecture. 
Based on these two case studies, we have identified 
the drivers, constraints and actions taken to establish 
a modular architecture, which are represented in 
Figure 6. The actions and constraints span three broad 
categories: business architecture, process interfaces, 
and learning and negotiation. This suggests that the 
constraints must be viewed holistically and should 
not be narrowly perceived as a single category. 
Similarly, the actions should be designed to address 
the constraints across these categories. 
The findings from these two cases lead to the 
following five major lessons.
Figure 5: Summary of Constraints and Actions to Overcome Them at Electronics Corp.
Constraints Actions
Deficient PIP Specification • Addressed integration challenges by using best practice knowledge 
from major trading partners and RosettaNet consortium. 
Incompatible Process Interfaces • Formed cross-functional teams to document internal processes and 
identify sources of process incompatibility.
• Exploited best practices from major trading partners and RosettaNet 
consortium to address integration challenges. 
Lack of IT and Business Process 
Expertise 
• Used best practices developed from visiting major trading partners and 
attending training and workshops run by RosettaNet consortium. 
Declining Performance • Assimilated RosettaNet PIPs in a fault tolerant fashion through the 
parallel use of old processes.
• Used cross-functional teams and middleware to map PIP data into 
formats compatible with internal systems. 
Figure 6: Transitioning to a Modular Enterprise Architecture
Constraints
Business Architecture
• Encapsulated business services (DC)
• Standardized operating model (DC)
• Optimized back-office processes (EC)
Process Interfaces
• Developed proprietary PIPs (DC)
• Adopted RosettaNet PIPs (EC)
• Assimilated PIPs in a fault tolerant fashion (EC)
Learning and Negotiation
• Deployed cross-functional teams (DC, EC)
• Acquired best-practice know-how (DC, EC)
• Made long-term IT investments (DC, EC)
Actions
Drivers
• Market responsiveness (DC, EC)
• Industry standards (EC)
• Partner expectations (EC)
• Cost economies (DC)
Modular Enterprise 
Architecture
Profitable
Growth
DC = Found in the Delivery Corp. case
EC = Found in the Electronics Corp. case
Business Architecture
• Non-modular services (DC)
Process Interfaces
• Incompatible interfaces (DC, EC)
• Deficient PIP specification (EC)
Learning and Negotiation
• Decision criteria for IT investments (DC)
• Declining performance (EC)
• Limited expertise (DC, EC)
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Lesson 1: Optimize the Enterprise 
Architecture by Implementing Business 
Process Standards Where Appropriate
Delivery Corp.’s business model requires that services 
offered by business units be dynamically integrated 
to offer customers total solutions. It is transitioning 
from hardwired linkages between applications across 
business units to process standards. Accordingly, 
legacy applications are being reengineered to 
encapsulate services and standardize interfaces. 
Electronics Corp. optimized its back-office processes, 
which enabled interfaces to RosettaNet PIPs. Efforts 
to provide disciplined, standard processes on a solid 
IT infrastructure are critical to enabling business 
modularity.11 
Lesson 2: Match the Interface Approach 
to Business Requirements
The cases reveal two distinct approaches to 
standardizing interfaces and achieving business 
modularity. Electronics Corp. deployed RosettaNet 
PIPs to achieve loose coupling with suppliers and 
to expand partnering options. Being a small-to-
medium enterprise, this approach enabled it to focus 
resources and managerial attention on evaluating 
PIPs, prioritizing the ones to be initially adopted, 
and assimilating them. In contrast, Delivery Corp. 
established standardized interfaces among some 
of its services, through negotiation among internal 
stakeholders and with customers, to distinguish itself 
from competitors. 
Lesson 3: Understand Process 
Dependencies and Negotiate 
Standardized Process Interfaces 
Establishing interface standards entails negotiating 
global constraints among stakeholders to coordinate 
local actions. In both firms, PIP standards conflicted 
with established data architectures and process 
configurations. Electronics Corp.’s challenge related 
to the conflict between the XML specifications of 
RosettaNet PIPs for order management and its data 
architecture. Delivery Corp.’s challenge centered 
on the tension between negotiated interfaces and 
11 These findings are consistent with those reported by Ross, who 
claimed companies could not move to a modular enterprise architecture 
without first building a standard technology and disciplined process 
platform. See Ross, J. W. “Creating a Strategic IT Architecture 
Competency: Learning in Stages,” MIS Quarterly Executive (2:1), 
2003, pp. 31-43; and Ross, J. W., Weill, P., and Robertson, D. C. 
Enterprise Architecture as Strategy: Creating A Foundation for 
Business Execution, Harvard Business School Press,  2006.
APIs across systems in business units and customer 
organizations. 
Electronics Corp. applied public domain PIPs to 
coordinate actions with suppliers, which required the 
implementation team to become knowledgeable not 
only about RosettaNet PIPs, but also about trading 
partners’ internal IT platforms and processes. This 
understanding enabled the team to meaningfully 
negotiate data flows with partners. In the case of 
Delivery Corp., proprietary PIPs were used to 
integrate services across business units. These 
standards had to be negotiated among business units. 
In both cases, cross-functional teams helped the 
companies understand process dependencies and to 
negotiate interfaces that enabled loose coupling.
Lesson 4: Educate Key Stakeholders on 
the Economic Benefits of Standardized 
Process Interfaces 
Establishing a modular enterprise architecture requires 
support and commitment from senior managers, 
which means they have to be well versed on the 
economic implications. In the case of Delivery Corp., 
senior management was unaware of the economic 
implications of standardizing the interfaces of 
business services. Similarly Electronics Corp.’s 
management was unaware of the business potential 
of different RosettaNet PIPs in terms of coordination 
with the firm’s suppliers. 
To address gaps in managerial understanding, 
Delivery Corp. invested significant resources to 
communicate the economic value of standardizing 
interfaces to its executives, especially those in 
marketing and sales. Similarly, Electronics Corp. 
acquired and shared knowledge about the economic 
implications of RosettaNet PIPs from visiting 
major trading partners and by attending training 
and workshops run by the RosettaNet consortium. 
Likewise, Delivery Corp. participated in standard-
setting organizations for public domain PIPs and 
interacted regularly with its best practice customers. 
Lesson 5: Align Decision Criteria for IT 
Investments with a Modular Enterprise 
Architecture Strategy 
Investments to develop a modular enterprise 
architecture should be rationalized in terms of 
capabilities for agility and profitable growth. 
Consider the transition that Delivery Corp. had to 
make to adjust its IT investment decision criteria. 
Historically, personnel in marketing and sales focused 
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on revenue growth, not profit. As a result, they 
were not concerned about the cost of implementing 
process interfaces with customers and often sold them 
solutions that required idiosyncratic and customized 
interfaces. Now, not only are they fully conversant 
with standardized interfaces, but IT personnel are 
involved in front-end discussions on customer 
solutions. Decisions on IT investment for a particular 
solution or interface are increasingly evaluated on 
potential for profitable growth, rather than just on 
NPV. Similarly, Electronics Corp. examines PIP 
implementation costs against the future benefits from 
partnering flexibility and market responsiveness for its 
major product lines.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
A modular enterprise architecture provides a platform 
for profitable business growth. Transitioning to such 
an architecture requires a solid base of technology 
and data platforms, and processes. The transition 
can be gradual, allowing a company to absorb and 
build on changes resulting from each new module. 
Once implemented, a modular enterprise architecture 
will provide growing opportunities to deliver new 
connections to partners and customers or to add new 
products and services to core customer offerings.
APPENDIX A: Research 
Methodology 
We employed a case study methodology to understand 
the drivers, constraints, and actions required to 
transition to a modular enterprise architecture at 
Delivery Corp. and Electronics Corp. We collected 
data from multiple sources: interviews with senior 
executives at the firms, discussions with executives 
at customer and supplier firms, corporate documents, 
press releases, and trade press articles. Our work with 
Delivery Corp. began in its early years of growth 
through acquisition, which has enabled us to assess 
carefully the evolution of its enterprise architecture. 
We interviewed Electronic Corp.’s executives over 
a period of about two years and tracked various 
organizational activities and events during this 
time. Our data collection began during the time of 
Electronic Corp.’s adoption and implementation 
of RosettaNet PIPs. This helped us understand its 
transition to a modular enterprise architecture. 
RosettaNet’s mission is to develop global and open interorganizational business process 
standards to enable and support seamless business-to-business integration (B2Bi). Partner 
interface processes (PIPs) are the building blocks of RosettaNet standards. PIPs are organized 
into seven clusters—or groups of core business processes—that represent the backbone of a 
trading network: (1) partner product and service review, (2) product information, (3) order 
management, (4) inventory management, (5) marketing information management, (6) service 
and support, and (7) manufacturing. Below is a simplified schematic of supply chain automation 
using RosettaNet PIPs. 
RosettaNet PIPs in Order Management Processes
SupplierBuyer
RosettaNet PIP-enabled public business processesPrivate business process Private business process
Create purchase order PIP 3A4: Request purchase order Receive purchase order
Receive shipping doc PIP 3B2: Notify of Advanced Shipment Create shipping doc
Receive invoice PIP 3C3: Notify of Invoice Create invoice
Adapted from www.rosettanet.org
APPENDIX B: RosettaNet Partner Interface Processes (PIPs)
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